The Ripple Effect of the Pinochet Case by Jonas, Stacie
Human Rights Brief
Volume 11 | Issue 3 Article 10
2004
The Ripple Effect of the Pinochet Case
Stacie Jonas
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonas, Stacie. "The Ripple Effect of the Pinochet Case." Human Rights Brief 11, no. 3 (2004): 36-38.
T
HE 1998 DETENTION OF FORMER CHILEAN DICTATOR
Augusto Pinochet in London and the subsequent legal pro-
ceedings against him marked one of the most important
events in international law since Nuremberg. Although
Pinochet’s release was a blow to the struggle to end impunity for
human rights violators, five years later, it is clear that the case against
him has had lasting political and legal impacts in Chile and other
countries around the world. The legacy of the Pinochet case is a trib-
ute to three decades of creative and persistent collaboration between
legal pioneers and human rights advocates, many of whom continue
to fight for justice today. This article describes the ripple effects of the
“Pinochet precedent” in Chile and Argentina, highlighting ways that
international cases can help foster greater accountability at home.
PINOCHET CASE BACKGROUND
GENERAL AUGUSTO PINOCHET LED a 1973 military coup that over-
threw democratically-elected Chilean President Salvador Allende.
According to a national truth and reconciliation commission, at least
3,196 people were killed or forcibly disappeared during Pinochet’s sub-
sequent 17-year dictatorship. Thousands more were tortured or exiled.
On October 16, 1998, British authorities detained Augusto
Pinochet in London on an arrest warrant issued by Spanish Magistrate
Baltasar Garzón. Garzón had charged Pinochet with genocide, terror-
ism, and torture committed during the Chilean dictatorship.
Although Garzón’s complaint included several Spanish victims,
the majority were Chilean citizens who had been killed or tortured in
Chile. Garzón’s case was therefore largely founded on the principle of
universal jurisdiction—that certain crimes are so egregious that they
constitute crimes against humanity and can therefore be prosecuted in
any court in the world.
In November 1998, a panel of British law lords ruled that
Pinochet did not enjoy immunity from prosecution as a former head
of state, and he could be extradited to Spain. This decision, based
largely on customary international law, was set aside, however, when
one of the judges who heard the appeal was found to have ties to
Amnesty International. A larger panel of law lords heard the appeal
again in March 1999, and in a 6-1 decision, reaffirmed that Pinochet
could be extradited. This time, however, the majority based their deci-
sion primarily on British domestic law and limited Pinochet’s extra-
ditable crimes to acts of torture committed after the UK ratified and
incorporated the UN Convention Against Torture into domestic legis-
lation in 1988.
The Chilean government and other extradition opponents then
urged the British government to send the former dictator back to
Chile on medical grounds. Despite the protests of legal and medical
experts from several countries, British Home Secretary Jack Straw
released Pinochet on March 2, 2000, ostensibly on health grounds.
IMPACT OF THE PINOCHET CASE IN CHILE
PRIOR TO PINOCHET’S LONDON ARREST, a Chilean trial of the for-
mer dictator seemed impossible. Pinochet was protected by Decree
Law 2191, an amnesty declared by the military junta in 1978 to par-
don human rights crimes committed between the September 11, 1973
coup and March 10, 1978, when the state of siege was lifted. Although
a referendum and elections forced Pinochet out of power in 1990, the
General stayed on as Commander-in-Chief of the Army until 1997.
He then immediately assumed a non-elected, lifetime seat in the
Chilean Senate, giving him additional parliamentary immunity from
prosecution. In 2000, the Chilean Congress granted yet another layer
of immunity to all “former Presidents of the Republic.”
Much had changed in Chile during Pinochet’s 16-month deten-
tion, however. Pinochet’s arrest put human rights issues back in the
headlines, giving victims new voice and sending the message that the
international community considered Pinochet a criminal.  Although
a dozen cases had been filed against Pinochet in Chile prior to his
arrest, the detention emboldened victims to submit an avalanche of
new cases against the former dictator, mounting to nearly 300 by the
end of 2003.
The new political space created by Pinochet’s arrest was comple-
mented by judicial reforms implemented in the late 1990s that
changed the composition of the Chilean courts and removed many
Pinochet-appointed judges. Courts also began re-interpreting the
amnesty law. Even before Pinochet’s arrest, several judges ruled that
the amnesty could only be applied after an investigation. In cases of
forced disappearances, they went a step further. Since the bodies of the
victims had not been found, they held that disappearances were actu-
ally crimes of ongoing, aggravated kidnapping. Because the crime had
not ended before the 1978 amnesty law cut-off, the amnesty did not
prevent the prosecution of the perpetrators.
Chilean Judge Juan Guzmán was one of the first to uphold this
new interpretation of the amnesty law. Since January 1998, Guzmán
had been investigating Pinochet’s role in the 1973 disappearance of
over 70 political opponents in an operation known as the “Caravan of
Death.” Shortly after Pinochet’s return from London, Judge Guzmán
asked the courts to strip the former dictator of his parliamentary
immunity. The Supreme Court agreed, and Pinochet was indicted and
placed under house arrest. Based on new medical exams and a deposi-
tion, Judge Guzmán determined that the General was, in fact, fit to
stand trial. The Santiago Appeals Court disagreed, suspending the
legal proceedings against Pinochet on mental health grounds. The
Supreme Court upheld the suspension of the case in July 2002.
Pinochet resigned from the Senate shortly thereafter, but retained
immunity from prosecution as a “Former President of the Republic.” 
In 2003, victims’ lawyers argued that several public appearances
proved that Pinochet was able to stand trial. In August 2003, Judge
Guzmán again tried to strip Pinochet of his immunity, this time for
the disappearance of ten communist party leaders. The Chilean
Supreme Court rejected his petition on medical grounds.
A few months later, Pinochet gave a lengthy television interview,
claiming he was never a dictator and had no reason to ask for forgive-
ness. Victims’ lawyers pounced on the interview as evidence of
Pinochet’s fitness for trial and persuaded Judge Guzmán to request
that the courts reconsider stripping Pinochet of his immunity. The
Santiago Appeals Court will rule on the new request in 2004.
CHILEAN CASES AGAINST OTHER MILITARY OFFICERS
Pinochet’s detention also helped pave the way for the prosecu-
tion of other Chilean military officials. Prior to 1998, there had been
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only a few successful cases, primarily involving crimes explicitly
excluded from the amnesty or committed after the 1978 amnesty cut-
off. By July 2003, however, over 300 military officers had been indict-
ed and dozens had been convicted, many for disappearances that
occurred in the early dictatorship years. After Pinochet’s arrest, special
judges were appointed to work exclusively on human rights cases,
allowing for further breakthroughs. 
Despite this unprecedented progress, recent judicial rulings have
been contradictory. For example, there have been conflicting develop-
ments in two cases involving Pinochet’s former secret police chief,
Manuel Contreras. 
In December 2003, the 7th Bench of the Santiago Appeals
Court overturned an indictment of Contreras and two other defen-
dants charged with the “ongoing, aggravated kidnapping” of two
political opponents disappeared in 1974. In a 2-1 ruling, the Court
found that there was insufficient evidence that the victims were still
being detained and that the idea of disappearance as an ongoing act of
kidnapping was therefore a legal fiction.
In contrast, on January 5, 2004, the 5th Bench of the Santiago
Appeals Court upheld the conviction of Contreras and four other mil-
itary officers in a different case involving the 1974 disappearance of
Miguel Angel Sandoval. This was the first appellate level decision
upholding the interpretation of forced disappearance as an ongoing,
non-amnestiable crime of aggravated kidnapping in the sentencing
phase. Although the decision was founded on domestic law principles,
it broke new ground in Chilean jurisprudence by also extensively rely-
ing on international law.
In the 2-1 decision, the Court noted that the Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearances, signed by Chile in 1996,
defines forced disappearance as an ongoing or permanent crime as
long as the fate of the victims is unknown and obliges signatories to
punish those responsible. Although the Convention has not yet been
ratified by the Chilean Congress, the judges highlighted Chile’s obli-
gations under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties stipulating that a State that has signed or expressed consent to
a treaty is “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty,” even when it is still awaiting ratification.
The judges further noted that forced disappearances have been
defined as a “crime against humanity” by a number of international
instruments including the UN Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Forced Disappearance and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. They pointed out that these and other
international instruments require both the investigation and punish-
ment of crimes against humanity. 
The decision also cited the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights’ March 14, 2001 decision in the Barrios Altos case
(Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru), which affirms that amnesties and
statutes of limitations cannot be applied to grave violations of human
rights, including forced disappearance. 
Contreras is now seeking a hearing by the full Chilean Supreme
Court on the Sandoval decision, an appeal that would ordinarily be
heard by the five-member “Criminal Chamber.” Because Chile is gov-
erned by a civil law system, judges are not obliged to follow legal
precedents. However, a decision by the Supreme Court to uphold
Contreras’ conviction in the Sandoval case would mark a historic vic-
tory in the struggle for justice in Chile, encouraging other judges and
victims in their efforts against impunity.
ABOLISHING THE CHILEAN AMNESTY?
Although judges in Chile have found creative ways around the
amnesty law, human rights advocates have long sought the repeal of
the law by the executive branch. The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights echoed these demands in numerous reports, deeming
the government’s failure to revoke or amend the law a violation of the
American Convention on Human Rights.
Thus far, the Chilean government has been unwilling or unable
to act. In a recent proposal calling for new human rights legislation,
Chilean President Ricardo Lagos stated that his government would
“leave the interpretation of the Amnesty Law to the courts.” He then
proposed a series of measures including the provision of immunity or
reduced sentences for military officers who provide useful, verifiable
information about human rights crimes to the courts. Although Lagos’
proposal also included measures such as increased reparations for fam-
ilies of human rights victims and the creation of a commission to
investigate torture, the immunity provisions have been criticized as a
serious setback in the efforts to end impunity. The proposal is current-
ly under consideration by the Chilean Congress.
IMPUNITY UNDER FIRE IN ARGENTINA
NEIGHBORING ARGENTINA HAS SEEN EVEN MORE dramatic advances
in the struggle for accountability in the years since Pinochet’s arrest. 
After the end of Argentina’s 1976-1983 “dirty war,” authorities
tried several military officers for human rights crimes in the Argentine
courts. Under pressure from the military, however, Congress passed
two amnesty laws that protected many rights violators from prosecu-
tion. The two laws, known as the "Full Stop" and “Due Obedience”
laws, respectively set a 60-day deadline for the filing of human rights
cases and exempted low-level officers from trial on the grounds that
they were unaware of the illegality of their orders. Former Argentine
President Carlos Menem later pardoned military officers who were
indicted or convicted despite these laws.
Faced with these new obstacles, victims joined international
human rights advocates in filing cases against Argentine human rights
violators in Italy, Sweden, Germany, France, and Spain. In March
1996, a few months before charges were filed against Pinochet,
Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón began investigating crimes committed
during the dirty war.
Although one Argentine naval officer, Adolfo Scilingo, turned
himself over to Spanish authorities in 1997, until recently, extradition
requests from Spain and other foreign courts largely fell on deaf ears.
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In 1998, President Carlos Menem issued Decree 111/98, formal-
ly refusing to cooperate with Judge Garzón’s investigation. Menem’s
successor, Fernando De la Rúa, reinforced this move in 2001 with
Decree 1581/01, rejecting any extradition request for crimes commit-
ted on Argentine territory.
An Argentine naval officer living in Mexico, however, was
unable to avoid being “Pinocheted.” Ricardo Miguel Cavallo was
detained in Cancún on August 24, 2000, after being identified by
torture victims. Judge Garzón immediately issued a warrant for
Cavallo’s arrest and, on June 10, 2003, the Mexican Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the extradition. 
In contrast to his predecessors, newly elected Argentine President
Nestor Kirchner did nothing to prevent Cavallo’s extradition and
refused to provide the naval officer with legal assistance, asserting, “the
Argentine state does not defend delinquents.” An oral trial of both
Cavallo and Scilingo before a panel of the Spanish National Criminal
Court (Audencia Nacional) is expected to begin in 2004.
NEW ACCOUNTABILITY EFFORTS IN ARGENTINA
Both Pinochet’s arrest and investigations of Argentine military
officers in foreign courts added momentum to the existing move-
ment against impunity, facilitating a wave of new cases in the
Argentine courts. 
Between 1998 and 2002, the Argentine courts indicted a num-
ber of military officers for human rights crimes not covered by the
amnesties. These prosecutions focused on the kidnappings of prison-
ers’ babies and the crimes of Operation Condor, a coordinated cam-
paign uniting the security forces of Southern Cone dictatorships to
carry out joint operations against political opponents. 
In 2003, under the new Kirchner administration, foreign inves-
tigations of Argentine rights violators had an even more visible impact.
Acting on Judge Garzón’s outstanding arrest warrant, on July 24,
2003, Argentine Judge Rodolfo Canicoba ordered the arrest of 45 mil-
itary officers and one civilian charged with crimes of genocide, terror-
ism, and torture. Canicoba’s unprecedented move was followed by
President Kirchner’s equally bold decisions to repeal De la Rua’s 2001
decree preventing the extradition of the military officers and to for-
mally ratify the UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.
ARGENTINE CONGRESS ANNULS AMNESTIES
These developments prompted the Argentine Congress in August
2003 to annul the Argentine amnesty laws and to pass additional leg-
islation facilitating the prosecution of crimes against humanity.
While some critics questioned the practical effects of the new
law, the annulment sent a clear political message. It “gives the green
light to judges and prosecutors to open or re-open cases,” stresses one
Argentine human rights lawyer, “and puts pressure on the courts to
face the question of the constitutionality of the amnesty laws.”
In fact, a number of Federal District Courts have already held
that the amnesty laws are unconstitutional and, in 2001, the Federal
Appeals Court for Buenos Aires upheld a lower court ruling on the
unconstitutionality of the amnesties. Although the Supreme Court
recently postponed a decision on this appeal, it may still rule on the
issue before the end of 2004.
Meanwhile, the Spanish government used the Argentine
Congress’ annulment of the amnesty law as an excuse to block extra-
dition efforts. Never fully supportive of Judge Garzón’s initiative, the
Spanish government announced on August 23, 2003 that their coun-
try would no longer seek the officers’ extradition because they now
could be tried in the Argentine courts.
Shortly thereafter, Argentine authorities released most of the
men detained under the Spanish warrant. However, the Federal
Appeals Court for Buenos Aires immediately re-opened two cases
involving hundreds of dictatorship crimes and issued new arrest war-
rants for dozens of the released officers. 
CONCLUSION
RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILE AND ARGENTINA high-
light the ripple effect set in motion by the international cases against
Pinochet and other military officers. They also show, however, that
while extradition requests from foreign courts can help create the
political will for prosecutions at home, domestic political factors also
influence the extent to which international cases have an impact.
President Kirchner’s commitment to justice, for example, has allowed
the efforts against impunity to gain new ground in Argentina. 
Although Pinochet’s detention clearly had lasting effects, it is
important to remember that the case did not begin with his arrest in
London. It was, instead, the product of nearly three decades of persist-
ent work by victims, human rights advocates, and lawyers in Chile and
around the world who carefully documented violations, filed cases
even when they seemed destined for failure, and refused to give up the
demand for truth and justice. Their insistent and effective activism
also helped propel the case even when many of the governments
involved wanted it to disappear. Further, the Pinochet case developed
in the context of an unmistakable trend towards greater international
justice, evidenced, for example, by the creation of the Ad-Hoc
Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Court.
Just as the case against Pinochet did not begin with his arrest in
London, it did not fail with his release. In addition to setting an
important legal precedent, the case helped educate the world about
Pinochet’s crimes and the potential of international law, inspiring new
legal efforts against dictators and human rights violators in countries
around the world. It also re-energized the human rights movements in
Chile and Argentina, giving victims new voice, putting human rights
issues back at the center of public debate, and reminding government
and military officials that neither amnesty laws nor the mere passage
of time could silence the call for justice. 
According to legal scholar Naomi Roht-Arriaza, author of a
forthcoming book entitled The Pinochet Effect, the most important
impact of Pinochet’s London arrest was that it “changed the percep-
tion of what was possible,” creating the political and psychological
space that allowed for the effective application of previously existing
legal theories and arguments.
While the “Pinochet precedent” has led to encouraging develop-
ments in both Chile and Argentina, significant challenges remain. The
Argentine Supreme Court now has a historic opportunity to declare
the national amnesty laws unconstitutional, echoing the growing
international consensus that egregious human rights crimes cannot go
unpunished. While the recent Santiago Appeals Court decision in the
Sandoval case should serve as a building block for further incorpora-
tion of international law into Chilean jurisprudence, other branches of
the Chilean government must also ensure that domestic legislation
upholds international obligations to investigate and punish human
rights crimes. As long as the crimes of the Chilean and Argentine dic-
tatorships remain unpunished at home, international mechanisms—
including universal jurisdiction—must continue to serve as a comple-
ment to domestic efforts to hold human rights violators accountable
for their crimes.  HRB
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